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Abstract
This research investigates a novel construct, reactionism – the belief that the past is good
and should be resurrected. Specifically, these studies test two competing hypotheses. It could be
that reactionism is purely perceptual, such that perceiving the past as positive will promote
reactionary attitudes and behavior. Or reactionism could be motivated, such that perceiving
change away from the past as threatening is necessary for reactionary attitudes and behavior. In
study 1, I tested whether reactionism beliefs are related to greater support for policies that would
resurrect the past. The prediction was unsupported, suggesting that reactionism beliefs are
motivated. In study 2, the competing perceptual and motivation hypotheses were directly tested.
Given the evidence from Study 1, I predicted that framing the past as positive (vs. negative) and
change as threatening (vs. nonthreatening) increases support, and voting for, past policies. The
motivation hypothesis was supported. Implications and future directions are discussed.
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1
Reactionism: Resurrecting the Past
People generally have three options when contemplating change: they can do what they
have already been doing (i.e., status quo), they can do something new, or revert back to
something from the past (i.e., status quo ante). Of these three options the dominant choice is to
stick with the status quo. A great deal of research has explored the psychological antecedents
and consequences (e.g., loss aversion, endowment effects, risk aversion, existence and longevity
biases, system justification motives) of peoples’ preference for the status quo (e.g., Anderson,
2003; Crandall, Eidelman, Skitka, & Morgan, 2009; Eidelman & Crandall, 2009; Eidelman,
Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Ritov
& Baron, 1992; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988).
In light of the prevalence of the status quo bias, people less frequently choose something
new. However, there are circumstances when people prefer something new. For example, people
may prefer new technology when it has enhanced or unique features above and beyond what they
already have (Zhou & Nakamoto, 2007). In the context of goal progress, people may prefer a
new (and perceivably riskier) strategy to make gains towards their goal (Zou, Scholer, &
Higgins, 2014). It would appear that the choice for something new requires the perception that
the benefits adequately exceed the cost.
The choice for something from the past – the status quo ante – is far less understood and
remains virtually unexplored in the psychological sciences. Within the social sciences it has been
political scientists who specialize in political thought who have most extensively discussed a
preference for the status quo ante (e.g., Robin, 2011). Political scientists are most likely to refer
to those who prefer the status quo ante as a reactionary. However, when they do they are often
referring to someone on the extreme “far right” of the political spectrum (e.g., fascists). Further,
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they often describe a preference for the status quo ante as reactionaryism – the desire to
reestablish conservative policies as a reaction to the perceived threat of liberal policies.
Psychologists studying the affective phenomenon of nostalgia have also tried to
characterize people’s affinity for the past (e.g., Batcho, 1995; Holbrook, 1993; Sedikides,
Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2008). From their perspective people who have positive
memories from early in life tend to have complex bittersweet emotions when reflecting on the
past with important and beneficial psychological outcomes (Sedikides et al., 2008).
In this research I will approach the tendency to prefer the way things used to be as a
psychological phenomenon that is carefully adopted and employed. In my conceptualization I
will use the term reactionism to describe the preference for the way things used to be as a belief
or worldview that may facilitate a person’s desire to resurrect something from the past.
The goal of these studies is to test whether reactionism is accurately conceptualized as
motivated. It could be that simply perceiving that past as positive is sufficient to motivate
individuals to want to resurrect the past. Or, it could be that perceiving threat, particularly a
threat associated with change away from the past, is necessary to both perceive the past
positively and be motivated to resurrect the past.
With the emergence of popular politicians on the political left (e.g., Bernie Sanders) and
right (e.g., Donald Trump) espousing past ideals, this research is addressing a timely and
important question: is a preference for the past and the desire to resurrect it an overlooked
psychological phenomenon that explains support for social, political, economic policies which
can broadly impact our society?

3
History and Origin of Reactionism
The term reactionary was first formally used by Lazare Carnot in a 1797 essay regarding
the Coup of 18 Fructidor (i.e., coup d’état) near to end of the French Revolution (Online
Etymology Dictionary). In the essay, Carnot lamented that he had been ousted from the
government and exiled along with “the same villains, then acting as factious reactionaries” after
he had “contributed to extricate [the Directory] from new dangers.” Carnot was a conservative;
however he was opposed to hereditary rule in France due to his belief in its tendency to become
despotic. He opposed Napoleon’s desire for absolute rule, labeling supporters as reactive to
democratic demands. This would become the first record where being labeled a reactionary
would refer to a person’s desire to resurrect the status quo ante (i.e., monarchical rule).
There is little recorded use of the term reactionary in the 19th century. When used, it was
often in reference to the disposition of a counter-revolutionary – someone fighting against
change. Often the term was employed by socialist and communist who sought to stigmatize the
counter-revolutionaries fighting for totalitarian regimes. In the early 20th century as the Nazi
party established itself as the Third Reich, to convey that they had resurrected the German
empire of old, supporters were often referred to as reactionaries. Here, reactionaries would
become inextricably linked with authoritarian and fascist regimes among political thinkers;
hence, reactionaryism’s modern definition as an extreme right wing movement (Robin, 2011).
However, in his 1943 essay Credo of a Reactionary Francis Stuart Campbell would
attempt to divorce the term reactionary from the stigma of an authoritarian apologist. In his
words, “The term ‘reactionary’ as I use it does not stand for a definite and immutable set of
ideas. It stands for an attitude of mind.” He continues, “I see no more virtue in looking forward
longingly to an unknown future than in looking backward nostalgically to known and proven
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values.” It is Campbell’s sentiment, that to be a reactionary involves an “attitude of mind” which
most closely relates to my conceptualization of reactionism. He goes on to clarify that past
“known and proven values” are good and perceived to have been lost – no longer the status quo.
To distinguish reactionism from a status quo bias I have also adopted the notion that it is related
to aspects of past that are perceived as good and are no longer in existence.
Related Constructs
There are several constructs that are conceptually similar and potentially related to
reactionism. For example, looking on the past favorably may involve feelings of nostalgia. Also,
conservatives’ affinity for traditions would indicate that aspects of the past have something of
value and is worth preserving. Below I will discuss how nostalgia and conservatism are similar
to, and distinct from, reactionism, and how different predictions can be derived from each
construct. An argument could be made that status quo bias is related to reactionism. However, as
previously mentioned, I approach the conceptualization of reactionism as an attitude that leads to
a preference towards what once was, rather than what is. This is not to say that reactionism
captures a desire to go back in time, but a desire to recreate or resurrect what once was because it
is good, and potentially better, than what is or what will be.
Nostalgia. In Campbell’s (1943) treatise he mentions, “looking backward nostalgically”.
Personal nostalgia is currently conceptualized as a mostly positive (albeit bittersweet) emotional
experience that arises from looking back at our own past (Sedikides et al., 2008; Wildschut,
Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). Sedikides et al. (2008) argues that personal nostalgia
serves a palliative role in alleviating loneliness, negative mood, and existential threats by
fostering positive thoughts of social connectedness from our past, which ultimately boosts selfesteem. While personal nostalgia certainly contains cognitive elements related to self-relevant
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memories within specific social contexts, nostalgia is primarily an affective phenomenon
(Batcho, 1995, 1998; Holbrook & Schindler, 1994; Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & Wildschut,
2008; Sedikides et al., 2008; Smeekes, 2015; Wildschut et al., 2006).
An important conceptual distinction can be drawn between reactionism and personal
nostalgia. Nostalgic thoughts and feelings often begin with negative affect due to feelings of loss,
loneliness, or social exclusion, for example (Batcho, 1995, Holbrook & Schindler, 1994;
Sedikides et al., 2008; Wildschut et al., 2006). And while feelings of nostalgia culminate in
positive affect and a boost in esteem, the positive affect co-occurs with negative affect due, in
part, to people’s understanding that the past they fondly remember cannot be re-created
(Sedikides et al., 2008; Wildschut et al., 2006). Reactionism, which could also arise from
negative experiences, captures the belief, and perhaps the motivation, that the past can be
resurrected or re-created. Therefore, one primary distinction between reactionism and nostalgia
hinges on whether or not people believe the past can and should be resurrected.
Nostalgia can also be experienced when people think of the collective in-group. In
Smeekes (2015) conceptualization, it is argued that collective nostalgia is experienced
specifically in reference to a collective for whom the person is an in-group member. This is
consistent with Sedikides et al’s. (2008) definition of nostalgia which states that the self (or in
the case of collective nostalgia, the in-group) is positioned as the protagonist when reminiscing
about the past. In a compelling program of research, Smeekes and Verkuyten (2013; 2014) have
demonstrated that people are motivated to perceive self-continuity across time. And that
perceiving self-continuity promotes in-group identification and affiliation. Further, people often
enhance their perception of self-continuity by perceiving the in-group as more cohesive over
time, thereby strengthening in-group identification. When the in-group is threatened people start
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to develop feelings of nostalgia towards the ingroup of the past – collective nostalgia – and begin
to use in-group defenses (Smeekes, 2015; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013; 2014). Frequency of
nostalgic thoughts toward the national ingroup (i.e., “national nostalgia”) increased among Dutch
nationals when primed to think about the influx of immigrants and refugees. More frequent
nostalgic thoughts about the nation predicted the belief in autochthony – the nation belongs to
the original inhabitants – which then predicted greater prejudice towards immigrants and a desire
to restrict immigration to the Netherlands (Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2014).
Given that people can experience nostalgia toward a collective of individuals it is
plausible that feelings of collective nostalgia may facilitate, or at least co-occur with,
reactionism. For example, when Dutch participants in Smeekes et al’s., (2014) study’s show a
preference to reduce immigration because they want give the country back to the original
inhabitants, they are essentially choosing to restore a past that existed for a past ingroup. I would
argue that these authors are demonstrating reactionism, since they were able to show that
frequently longing for the (presumably better) national past leads to a preference to resurrect the
past, particularly when societal changes are made salient.
One important distinction between reactionism and collective nostalgia is that collective
nostalgia is circumscribed so that it only includes concerns about the ingroup. Reactionism
beliefs can also be centered on the ingroup. But it can also be centered on the individual who
might wish to resurrect an idiosyncratic aspect of the past unrelated to the ingroup, a process not
yet reported in the social psychological literature. Another important distinction is that
reactionism beliefs may motivate symbolic reactionary behavior. An individual who sees societal
decline in one domain (e.g., diluted culture through over immigration) might support policies
that restore unrelated aspects of the past (e.g., deregulation of financial markets) as means of
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fulfilling their desire to restore “past glories”, or perhaps compensate for the threat of societal
change. Finally, these collective nostalgia studies were limited since they did not directly tap
people’s evaluation that the past was better than the present or future. Rather, they focused on the
frequency to which people longed for the past (though, speculatively, perhaps greater frequencies
of nostalgic reflections reflect greater perceived threat due to societal change). Moreover, the
researchers did not directly manipulate whether the past was better than the status quo or future,
but rather whether or not the past was something people generally long for, which at best implies
the past was better.
In order to demonstrate that reactionism is distinct from collective nostalgia, the belief
that the past is better than the status quo or future, and worthy of resurrecting, should be able to
uniquely predict support for a policy from the past beyond feelings of collective nostalgia.
Further, reactionism should predict support for past policies beyond general feelings of personal
and historic nostalgia. This would rule out the possibility that reactionism is confounded with an
affective process that facilitates the desire to re-establish a higher status for the ingroup or to
simply relive a personal past (see the Discussion for ideas on how the affective processes
underlying reactionism would differ from those related to nostalgia as this question is beyond the
scope of the present studies).
There is evidence that nostalgia is connected to “sensitive periods” of a person’s past
(e.g., Holbrook, 1993, 1994; Holbrook & Schindler, 1994). In their research on the relationship
between consumer behaviors and feelings of nostalgia, Holbrook and Schindler (1994)
developed a measure of historic nostalgia similar to reactionism. It captured positive attitudes
towards qualities of the past and negative attitudes toward the future (which were reverse
scored). The researchers demonstrated that positive attitudes towards the past predicted people’s
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liking of fashion models depicted as representing past cultural eras. However, the fashion model
that tended to be rated highest for each participant portrayed fashion and products that were
specific to a person’s age in the past (~ 14 years old) – their “sensitive period”. So while these
researchers explored the effects of evaluations of the past, they were focused on past experiences
within a person’s lifetime. Reactionism goes beyond historic nostalgia conceptually, by allowing
for positive evaluations of a past that was not experienced by the individual to influence their
attitudes and choices. No one alive today was alive in the 1880’s, but I hold that it is possible,
and indeed likely when the future is perceived to harbor societal decline, to prefer laws, policies,
and social dynamics that existed in the 1880’s instead of what we have now.
Conservatism: Political and psychological science perspectives. At first, reactionism
and conservatism would appear to overlap significantly. However, according to political scientist
Corey Robin (2011) conservatism is rooted in a desire to conserve liberty and privileges. This
implies that institutions and policies that confer liberty and privileges, while rooted in the past,
are still in existence. Consistent with this notion are historical examples, such as when
conservatives opposed the liberation of slaves, suffrage rights for women and ethnic and racial
minorities, and many other progressive movements that would seemingly water down the power
of the privileged (Robin, 2011). Reactionism, though, is a belief directed to something that no
longer exists, not something that needs to be maintained – which is a status quo bias. However,
once conservatives begin to perceive that privileges or entitlements have been lost, then
reactionism would more accurately characterize a motivation to restore what was lost. Therefore,
while reactionism should certainly compliment and perhaps predict conservatism, it is a distinct
phenomenon that applies when policies or institutions (that perhaps confer privileges or status)
are to be restored, not maintained.
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Research on the psychological antecedents and consequences of conservatism has been
extensive since researchers started investigating the authoritarian personality during WWII
(Fromm, 1941). Fromm believed that authoritarianism was a sickness of the German people.
Using a personality approach to further explicate Fromm’s thesis, conservatives started to be
characterized as submissive to authority. They are characterized as rigidly and dogmatically
preferring to maintain the mandates of cultural and religious traditions and tend to elect
authoritative leaders (i.e., Right Wing Authoritariansim, RWA; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altmeyer, 1981; Rokeach, 1960). Conservatives have also been
characterized as having a preference to dominate and have authority over other people and
groups in order to establish and maintain social and economic hierarchies related to class and
race (i.e., Social Dominance Orientation, SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).
Combined, tendencies towards right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance reliably predict
conservative attitudes in the context of politics and prejudice (Altmeyer, 1998; Duckitt, Wagner,
du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). However, Stanley Milgram (1963) powerfully demonstrated that
situational forces play in people’s submission to authority. A supposedly conservative
characteristic, obedience to authority was a phenomenon far more common than to simply be a
sickness experienced within a particular culture. Importantly, he demonstrated that submission to
authority was a matter of degree that could be experimentally induced, and relied, perhaps more
so, on specific characteristics of the situation than on specific personality traits.
Integrating situational factors and individual differences, researchers began to use a
motivated social cognition approach to assess epistemic, existential, and ideological motives that
promote conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b, Jost et al., 2007).
For example, conservatism has been linked to avoiding ambiguity, uncertainty, and abstraction
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(Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948; Jost et al., 2007; Wilson, 1973), a need for closure (Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994), lower sophistication and integrative complexity (Sidanius, 1988; Tetlock,
1984), a need for order and structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, &
O’Brien, 1995), greater perceptions of threat (Jost et al., 2007; Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005),
greater self interest (Sears & Funk, 1991), and greater system legitimizing (i.e., status quo
maintaining) beliefs (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, Kay, & Thorisdottir, 2009). From this perspective
conservatism can arise from situational cues that promote these epistemic, existential, and
ideological motives. Further, conservatism is especially likely among those who have personality
characteristics related to more traditional forms of conservatism (i.e., those higher in
authoritarian and dominance tendencies) that draw their attention to those cues.
As previously mentioned, reactionism lends itself to the promotion of conservatism since
a core motive is to conserve a status quo rooted in the past (Altmeyer, 1998; Jost et al., 2003a;
Pratto et al., 1994). Thus, reactionism could be characterized as an ideological motive within the
Jost et al. (2003) framework, alongside SDO, RWA, system justification, and the rationalization
of self-interest. Indeed, conservatives could be trying to preserve qualities of past (e.g., religious
and cultural traditions) that are perceived as better than countercultural movements (e.g.,
feminism, political correctness) or the proposed policies of left. But while the motivation to
preserve traditions, policies, and hierarchies of the past is best characterized by right-wing
authoritarianism and dominance orientation, these constructs fail to capture the distinct belief
that past traditions, policies, and hierarchies no longer exist and need to be resurrected. In other
words, they may conflate what is with what was. Reactionism is driven by the motivation to
restore, not maintain, a good past that no longer exists. Therefore, reactionism should uniquely
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predict preferences for policies that no longer exist beyond general conservatism and related
constructs like right-wing authoritarians and social dominance orientation.
Competing Hypotheses
There is reason to believe that simply perceiving that past as positive will be sufficient
for engendering support for reactionary policies and promote reactionary behavior. Many people
regularly encounter information that glorifies the past as being simpler and more wholesome.
Often, people will lament how technology is driving people apart or that the breakdown of the
nuclear family is the source of society’s woes. Persistently encountering information that the past
is better than the way things are, or will be, could lead to an affinity to the past due to mere
exposure (Zajonc, 1968). From this perspective, simply perceiving the past as positive is
sufficient for promoting the motivation to resurrect the past since it will seem like the more
familiar and likeable option. A potential mechanism for frequent exposure of past positive
framing is intergenerational transmission of political preferences. Researchers have demonstrated
that among politicized families children tend to adopt their parents political views (Jennings,
Stoker, & Bowers, 2009).
However, an affinity for the past could also develop should perceiving the past as
positive serve to fulfill a psychological need, such as mitigating threat and uncertainty (Jost,
Federico, & Napier, 2009). The content of beliefs seems to be well suited for sustaining beliefs, a
phenomenon referred to as “elective affinities” that originated with Goethe (1809/1966). In Jost
et al.’s (2003a) motivated cognition framework, the belief that change is threatening is populated
by content that supports the belief; for example, perceiving the past as better than the way things
are, or will be. Thus, having an “elective” affinity for the past could be necessary for sustaining
the belief that change is unfavorable. Moreover, elective affinities are conceptualized as being
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recursive. Thus, the belief that change leads to negative outcomes may make the past look better,
and believing that the past is better may make change feel threatening. From this perspective, a
belief (i.e., the perception) that change is threatening should be necessary to promote the
motivation to resurrect a positive past.
Overview of Studies
The goal of the present program of research is to test the predictions that are derived from
the assumptions of reactionism, namely, that reactionism will uniquely predict increases in
people’s preference to re-establish a positive past beyond related constructs such as nostalgia and
conservatism. In the first study, I will test a reactionism scale’s ability to uniquely predict (i.e.,
predictive validity) policy preferences that reflect the status quo ante (i.e., resurrecting a past
policy) rather than policies maintaining the status quo, or new/future policies. I predict that
reactionism will be positively related to and uniquely predict preferences for status quo ante
policies beyond nostalgia and conservatism, will be positively related to, but fail to uniquely
predict preferences for status quo policies beyond measures of conservatism, and will be
negatively related to, but fail to uniquely predict an aversion to novel policies beyond measures
of conservatism.
In the second study I will test the prediction that perceiving the past as positive (vs.
negative) and change away from the past as threatening (vs. non-threatening) will causally
influence reactionistic policy preferences and reactionary behavior (i.e., voting for the past
policy). By manipulating the framing of a novel policy as resurrecting a past that is better than
the alternative, people’s support of and voting for the policy should be increased. Reactionism
beliefs, that the past was better and should be resurrected, should explain increased support of
and voting for the past policy.

13
Study 1
In this study I test whether reactionism, as operationalized by the reactionism scale
developed for this study, uniquely predicts a preference for policies framed as having existed in
the past. I expect that reactionism will predict more positive evaluations of past policies, above
and beyond ideology and nostalgia. Moreover, it is expected that reactionism will be related to,
but not uniquely predict positive evaluations of status quo policies. And finally, that reactionism
will be related to, and uniquely predict negative evaluations of future policies.
Method
Participants and power. Undergraduate students were recruited for partial course credit
in a thirty minute online survey administered by computer in the lab. Using preliminary effects
sizes from exploratory data in G*Power software, to detect a semi-partial effect for reactionism
of sr2 = .03 with a residual variance of

= .65 a priori power analysis indicates that to

achieve a small effect size of ƒ2 = .046 using multiple regression with three predictors at 95%
power a minimum sample of N = 285 was be needed. To account for the possibility that 5% of
participants would fail the attention check items, I sought to collect a sample of N = 300.
However, due to limited resources (i.e., credits) I was only able to collect 170 participants, of
which 6 were excluded for failing the attention check items. This yielded a final sample of N =
164. The sample was 68.3% female, 74.4% White, with an average age, M = 19.2, SD = 2.0.
Procedure and materials. The study was presented as a task to determine people’s
opinions on political policies. After providing informed consent, participants responded to a
series of fully randomized questionnaires assessing their reactionism beliefs, support for a range
of policies, their political ideology, and tendencies towards experiencing personal and collective
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nostalgia. Afterward, they provided their demographic information, read a debriefing statement,
receive participation credit, and were thanked for their participation.
Reactionism.I developed an eleven-item measure of reactionism that is designed to
capture the extent to which the past is perceived as better than the present or future and should be
resurrected (α = .88). Using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 9 =
Strongly Agree, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the following items: a)
There are not many things from the past that are better than today (reverse scored); b) There
were points in history where people lived better than we do now; c) People from the past
experienced more of "the good life" than we do now; d) The future will never be as great as
certain times in the past; e) Society would not benefit from bringing back certain ways of life
from the past (reverse scored); f) Too many things these days are not as good as they once were;
g) I would support a community leader or politician that wanted to bring back certain past
policies; h) As society moves forward, we should consider reviving certain ideas, values, or
policies that are no longer in use; i) Once society moves past certain ideas, values, or policies
we should forget about them (reverse scored); j) Life would be better if we returned to “the good
old days”; k) The world I grew up in was better than the world today.
Policy support.To assess policy support, participants indicated their level of support for
six policy proposals (e.g., the size of desks on campus, the height of hand rails, the width of
sidewalks, the minimum length of university passwords, the minimum number of credits needed
to finish a degree, the number of emergency exits per building). They were randomly framed as
reflecting past policies (e.g., In the past,...), status quo policies (e.g., Currently,...), or future
policies (e.g., In the future,…). Fully counterbalancing the framing of the policies controlled for
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the possibility that some framing a particular policy a particular way would be inherently more
appealing than others.
Level of support for each policy was assessed with three items each using a Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 9 = Strongly Agree: a) I would support this policy;
b) This policy should not be implemented (reverse scored); c) Other people should support this
policy. The first item directly taps participants’ support; the second item taps participants’
aversion to the policy; the third item taps participants’ attitude strength via a desire to impress
their support onto others (Krosnick et al., 1993). For each participant the three policy support
items were averaged for each policy (α’s ranged from .66 to .95). The three policies for each
framing were averaged to create separate indices of policy support for past (M = 6.33, SD =
1.51), status quo (M = 6.64, SD = 1.46), and future policies (M = 6.51, SD = 1.42). In order to
contrast support for policies from the past with support for status quo and future policies, three
difference scores were calculated contrasting the past with status quo, past with future, and past
with status quo and future combined.
Political Ideology.
There has been considerable debate surrounding the conceptualization and
operationalization of political ideology (for a review, see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Most
commonly, ideology is measured along a single bi-polar continuum (often with a single item)
from liberalism to conservatism; and there is compelling reasons for doing so. A single bi-polar
dimension serves as a reliable heuristic in political discourse for understanding others’ policy
positions and worldviews, which is evidenced by stronger correlations between liberalism and
conservatism during election cycles when political discourse occurs more frequently (Federico &
Schneider, 2007; Jost et al., 2009).
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However, a growing number of scholars believe that using a single item fails to capture
the nuances in ideologies, and that there may be as many as six distinct ideologies (e.g., Choma,
Hafer, Dywan, Segalowitz, & Busseri, 2012; Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010). Along this
vein, three other methods of operationalizing political ideology have emerged. First, the social
and economic dimensions of political ideology are measured separately. This can be done with
two items, one for each dimension, or by using instruments that assess constructs are theorized to
reflect these dimensions such as SDO and RWA (Duckitt, 2001). Second, social and economic
ideology is measured by indexing self-identification along the liberal-conservative continuum for
constellation of contemporary social and economic political issues (Everett, 2013). Third,
liberalism and conservatism are measured separately by indicating level of support for a range of
issues that are uniquely important to liberals and conservatives (Kerlinger, 1984).
I employed a three-item measure of ideology requiring participants to self-report their
economic, social, and overall political ideology using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = Very
Liberal to 9 = Very Conservative. I have chosen this operationalization for two reasons; first, it is
my position that ideologies are worldviews that guide people’s perceptions of and support for
political issues, and that people generally have a relatively accurate understanding of their own
ideology that is predictive of a wide range of phenomenon (Federico & Schneider, 2007; Jost et
al., 2003a; Jost et al., 2009). Second, while using political issues to approximate people’s
ideology may be appropriate in certain circumstances, in this study’s design political issues are
positioned as criterion variables and cannot be appropriately used as control variables
approximating participants’ ideology. The three items were combined to form a moderately
reliable index of ideology (α = .52).
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In addition to the three, I employed the widely utilized right-wing authoritarianism (α =
.66; RWA; Altemeyer, 1998) and social dominance orientation (α = .90; SDO-2; Ho et al., 2012)
scales. This is to ensure I am operationalizing conservatism as broadly as possible and thus
providing a more stringent test of reactionism’s predictive ability.
Personal, collective, and historic nostalgia. To assess personal nostalgia, I used the
Nostalgia Inventory (NI; Batcho, 2007a) where participants assess how much they miss twenty
aspects of their past using a scale ranging from 1 = Not at all to 9 = Very much (α = .84; see
Appendix A for full list of items rated).
To assess collective nostalgia I adapted the two measures of national nostalgia (NN) used
in Smeekes et al. (2014), which was adapted from the NI. Using a Likert-type scale ranging from
1 = Very Rarely to 9 = Very Frequently participants responded to the following items: a) How
often do you experience nostalgia when you think about the America of the past?, b) How often
do you long for the good old days of the country?, c) How often do you long for the America of
the past?, d) How often do you feel nostalgic when you hear American songs from the past?, e)
How often do you bring to mind nostalgic experiences related to the way American people
were?, f) How often do you bring to mind nostalgic experiences related to the way American
society was?, (α = .84).
To assess historic nostalgia I used Holbrook and Schindler’s (1994) Nostalgia Scale (NS)
where participants rated their agreement for eight items (see Appendix B for all eight items, α =
.60) using a scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 9 = Strongly Agree. At first glance the
collective/national (NN) and historic (NS) nostalgia items appear similar to items on the
reactionism scale. However, these nostalgia scales assess people’s longing for the past, not their
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evaluations of the past. Due to the substantial operational overlap, however, controlling for
national and historic nostalgia provided a stringent test of reactionism’s predictive validity.
Results
Analytic strategy. As an initial test of the hypothesis that reactionism is positively
associated with support for policies that represent the status quo ante, weakly or unrelated to
support for policies that represent the status quo, and negatively related to support for novel
policies I used bivariate correlations. To test the hypothesis that reactionism is a unique predictor
of support for policies that represent the status quo ante but does not predict support for status
quo policies, I used hierarchical regression by entering the ideology and nostalgia indices in the
first step, and reactionism in the second step.
Bivariate correlations. Bivariate correlation analysis (see Table 1) did not support my
hypothesis that reactionism would be positively related to support for university policies framed
as resurrecting the past.
Table 1
Bivariate Correlations
1
2
1. React.
2. Past
.05
3. Present
.06
.33***
4. Future
.10
.28***
5. Pol. Ideo .58***
.21**
6. SDO
.39***
.08
7. RWA
.55***
.12
8. PNI
.32***
.06
9. HN
.57*** -.06
10. CN
.59***
.16*
***p < .001, **p < .01, **p < .05

3

.21**
.06
-.02
-.07
.08
-.04
.08

4

5

.02 -.03 .46***
.00 .71***
.09 .26**
-.01 .27***
.05 .52***

6

7

8

9

.54***
-.05
.22**
.24**

.21**
.34***
.45***

.25**
.36***

.27***

Hierarchical regression. Given that reactionism was unrelated to support for policies
from the past, there is reason to be skeptical that is would uniquely predict support for policies
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from the past. Indeed, reactionism was unrelated to support for university policies regardless of
their temporal construal (ps > .4). However, reactionism was uniquely and negatively related to
support for policies from the past relative to support for policies in the future, though the model
was only marginally significant (F(7, 156) = 1.78, b = -.34, p = .10, 95% CI = [-.67, -.01], ΔR2 =
.03, p = .04). Stated differently, reactionism predicted that participants were more supportive of
policies from the future than policies from the past. Reactionism was unrelated to the other
policy contrasts. It should also be noted that policy preferences did not differ as a function of
framing, suggesting that among students considering university policies a status quo bias did not
influence their preferences.
Discussion
Overall, the results of Study 1 did not support, and perhaps contradicted the prediction
that reactionism would be related to and predict support for policies from the past. There are two
possibilities for the findings, though the data doesn’t speak to these possibilities. First,
reactionism’s relationship with support for past policies could be motivated. Specifically,
perceiving the past as better and worthy of resurrecting may require dissatisfaction, and perhaps
frustration or anger with the way things are, or will be. Should reactionism be motivated by
negative affect, reflecting on a positive past would serve a similar palliative function to nostalgia,
which has been shown to mitigate the negative psychological consequences of existential threats.
However, with nostalgia the source of threat is unrelated to the positive past the reflected upon in
response to threat. In the face of threat, people simply search for a positive past experience to
help restore esteem. But with reactionism, the source of threat serves to direct attention to
specific aspects of the past that were better. Finally, while nostalgia might motivate an approach
orientation towards an immediate goal by restoring self-esteem, reactionism might motivate an
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approach orientation towards more abstract, broader societal goals that would restore society to a
past glory.
The second implication is that reactionism has been partially misconceptualized. Perhaps
the past simply serves as reference point, against which people gauge the well-being of society.
The more societal decline that is perceived, the more positively the past is perceived, and thus
the more motivated people are for change towards something, perhaps anything, better. Since the
future brings change, people may turn to the future in their hope of approximating the betterness
of the past. Hierarchical regression analysis speaks to this possibility. After accounting for
several variables that predict positive attitudes for the past, reactionism predicted more support
for future policies compared to past policies. Thus, what sets reactionism apart from the other
constructs may be its ability to predict a preference for change.
Study 2
Evidence from Study 1 suggests that reactionism is not merely a perceptual process, but
one that is motivated. In this study I pit the two hypotheses against each other: that perceiving
the past positively is sufficient for engendering more support for past policies, vs. perceiving
change away from the past as threatening is necessary for engendering more support for past
policies. By framing a novel policy proposal as reflecting a better (vs. worse) past when the
present and future are perceived negatively, support for a status quo ante policy should increase.
By using a novel policy I can eliminate people’s knowledge of the policy as an alternative
explanation for increased (or decreased) support. A known policy could be perceived as helping
or hurting a particular group, which might lead to intergroup processes such as prejudice that
would influence policy support. Therefore, a novel issue will provide the most stringent test of
the hypothesis that when people perceive that past as better they will prefer to resurrect the past.
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Method
Participants and power. Mechanical Turk workers participated in a five minute online
survey for $0.40 compensation (an effective hourly rate of $8 per hour which is slightly above
minimum wage). A priori power analysis indicated that a sample of N = 300 was needed. I
collected N = 305 participants, of which N = 201 successfully completed the attention and
manipulation checks and were retained for analysis. The sample consisted of a slight majority of
females (57.2%; two identified as transgendered), the average age of M = 40.0, SD = 13.7, it was
mostly White (79.6%) and educated beyond high school (92.5%), and had an income over
$39,999 (64.7%). Participants lived in 44 states and the District of Columbia.
Procedure and materials. The study was presented as an opinion survey to assess
support for a policy that would regulate the minimum width of roads. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four policy framing conditions where the valence of the past and threat of
change was manipulated. Specifically, participants read a political flyer/mailer (see Appendix C
for flyers) where the past was framed positively (Bring Back a Bygone Era!) or negatively (Let
Bygones Be Gone!), and where the threat of change was made salient (e.g., when the past policy
was to bring back narrower roads, Fatalities occur 33% more often at wider widths. Source: U.S.
DOT Federal Highway Admin.(2013)). The flyers were counterbalanced so that the roads were
being made either wider or narrower. I reasoned that participants would find wider roads more
favorable overall (perhaps they feel safer); but that when threatening information about wider
roads was available it still would lead to a preference for narrow roads when the past was framed
positively. Because of counterbalancing road width, the information in the threat condition was
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varied. Specifically, when proposing that making roads wider will bring back a positive past, or
avoid recreating negative past, the threatening alternative was, Accidents are 50% more likely at
narrow widths, and when proposing that making roads narrower will bring back a positive past,
or avoid recreating a negative past, the threatening alternative was, Fatalities occur 33% more
often at wider widths. For better or worse, keeping the threatening information factually accurate
was prioritized over keeping the threatening information constant. The rationale at design was
that should participant’s fact check the claims they will find them accurate and provide responses
that accurately reflect their attitudes on the issue.
Prior to reading the flyers, participants were told that politicians couldn’t decide on the
best regulation. And so participants were asked to study the policy proposal and decide how they
would vote on this policy in a local referendum during the next election cycle. Importantly, the
flyers concluded with the question, Change is happening, which side are you on? This rhetorical
question was meant to indicate to participants that the status quo is not an option, and therefore,
eliminate the possibility of status quo biases influencing judgments and decisions.
After reviewing the flyer, they indicated their support for the proposed policy, and
whether they would vote for or against the policy. Then they completed brief measures of
political ideology, nostalgia, and attitudes towards regulating road width, followed by a
manipulation check and demographic questions. Finally they were debriefed, thanked, and
automatically compensated upon returning to the Mechanical Turk web portal and entering a
unique participation code.
Policy Support. The same three-item policy assessment from study one was used and
formed a reliable index of policy support (α = .94). In addition, participants indicated their voting
intention (i.e., Do you intend to vote in favor of or against the proposal? For or Against).
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Predictors. The following scales were described in Study 1: reactionism (α = .93); selfreported political ideology (α = .96); right-wing authoritarianism (α = .93); social dominance
orientation (α = .95); collective nostalgia (α = .97).
Covariate. Because it is possible that some participants may have overall positive or
negative attitudes toward government regulation that might influence participants responses,
participants responded to three items assessing regulatory attitudes on the following Liker-type
scale, 1 = Not at All to 9 = Very Much. The items were: a) How much do you think the
government should be involved in regulating road width? b) How necessary do you think it is for
the government to regulate road width? c) How much are you opposed to government
regulation, regardless of what is being regulated? (reverse scored). The items were administered
after all of the measures, but prior to the demographics at the end of the study, and formed a
reliable index (α = .76). The scale was unaffected by the manipulation.
Manipulation Check. Participants responded to two final items before providing
demographic information that assessed how well they had read and remembered the information
from the political flyer. The first item, In the flyer you reviewed previously, what was proposed?
To make the roads wider or narrower?, was followed by a choice between wider or narrower.
The second item, In the flyer you reviewed previously, what was the numerical value of the
statistic provided, 33% or 50%?, was followed by a choice between 33% or 50%.
Results
Analytic strategy. Using univariate linear modeling I tested the competing predictions
that a) perceiving that past positively is sufficient for increasing reactionary attitudes and
behavior, or b) perceiving change as threatening is necessary for increasing reactionary attitudes
and behavior. I also used Hayes (2013) Process macro in SPSS to test whether more support for a
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reactionary policy explains increased voting for the policy when the past is framed positively,
but only when change is framed as threatening.
Policy Support. A main effect of valence (F(1, 192) = 19.10, p < .001,

= .09, 90% CI

= [.03, .17]) emerged such that participants were more supportive of the policy when the past
was framed positively (M = 5.59) than when framed negatively (M = 4.32). The effect of threat
trended in the predicted direction, but did not reach significance (p = .12). Importantly, support
for hypothesis b) was observed, that perceiving change as threatening is necessary for increasing
reactionary attitudes, but only when the past is framed positively. Linear modeling revealed the
predicted interaction, F(1, 192) = 17.38, p < .001,

= .08, 90% CI = [.02, .16]. When the past

framed positively people were more supportive of the policy (F(1, 192) = 17.45, p < .001) when
the alternative was threatening (M = 6.41) than when a threat was not presented (M = 4.76).
When the past was framed negatively, people’s support for the policy was marginally different
(F(1, 192) = 3.22, p = .07) when retaining a past policy was framed as threatening people were
less supportive of it (M = 3.94) compared to when a threat was not presented (M = 4.70).
An additional interaction was observed where the effect of threat was moderated by the
counterbalancing order, F(1, 192) = 16.35, p = .05,

= .02, 90% CI = [.02, .16]. This was

primarily driven by the fact that, as expected, people seem to prefer wider roads. When the past
represented wider roads, policy support was unaffected (F(1, 192) = .11, p = .75) by whether a
threat was present (M = 6.41) or not (M = 6.54). But when the past represented narrower roads,
policy support was higher (F(1, 192) = 6.22, p = .01) when a threat was present (M = 3.94) than
when it was not (M = 2.91).
Despite the effect of counterbalance as a moderator of threat, a three-way interaction
between threat, valence, and counterbalance did not emerge (p = .76). Overall, there was a main
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effect of counterbalance such that there was more policy support (F(1, 192) = 110.37, p < .001,
= .37, 90% CI = [.26, .45].) when the roads of the past were wider (M = 6.48) than when they
were narrower (M = 3.43). Regardless, when the past was framed positively and change was
threatening people were more supportive of a policy that would resurrect the past (see Figure 1a
& 1b). And when the past was framed negatively and threatening, there was less support for the
policy. Though, support for an unpopular policy (the narrower road) at least appears to be
unaffected by whether it’s framed as threatening or not (see Figure 1a).

Figure 1a
Policy Support: Narrower Roads in Past

Negative
Positive

No Threat

Threat
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Figure 1b
Policy Support: Wider Roads in Past

Negative
Positive

No Threat

Threat

Voting behavior. A main effect of valence was again observed, F(1, 192) = 16.34, p <
.001,

= .08, 90% CI = [.02, .16], such that people were more likely to vote for the policy when

the past was framed positively (62.1%) than when framed negatively (37.9%). The main effect of
threat again trended in the predicted direction, but was non-significant (p = .44). Evidence again
supported hypothesis b), that perceiving change as threatening is necessary for increasing
reactionary behavior, but was again qualified by valence. Linear modeling revealed the predicted
interaction, F(1, 192) = 6.49, p < .001,

= .03, 90% CI = [.001, .10]. When the past framed

positively people voted more for the policy (F(1, 192) = 5.9, p = .02) when the alternative was
threatening (72.1%) than when a threat was not presented (52.2%). When the past was framed
negatively, voting behavior did not differ (F(1, 192) = 1.47, p = .23). Though, there was a trend
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similar to policy support; when keeping the past was framed as threatening people voted less for
the policy (32.6%) compared to when a threat was not presented (43.2%).
A main effect of counterbalance was again observed. Overall, there was more voting for
the policy (F(1, 192) = 76.5, p < .001,

= .29, 90% CI = [.18, .38].) when the roads of the past

were wider (76.3%) than when they were narrower (23.7%).
Conditional effects analysis. Conditional effects analysis with 10,000 bootstrap samples
(Hayes, 2013) also revealed support for hypothesis b) that perceiving change as threatening is
necessary for increasing reactionary behavior – more support for and voting in favor of a policy
that would resurrect the past, b = 7.30, SE = 4.82, 95% CI = [.78, 17.3]. The coefficient
produced by the PROCESS macro is an estimate of the difference in conditional indirect effects
as a function of the independent variable. In my case, it tests whether there are differences in
how effectively policy support explains the effect of threat on voting behavior when comparing a
positively framed past to a negatively framed past. When change was threatening, people were
more supportive of a reactionary policy, which explained why they were more likely to vote for
the reactionary policy, but only when the past was framed positively (b = 7.73, SE = 4.18, 95%
CI = [3.0, 16.3]). There was not an indirect effect of policy support when the past was framed
negatively (95% CI = [-4.8, 5.9].
Additional analyses. Study 2 was intended as a conceptual test of reactionism. However,
as a test of the validity of the reactionism scale I developed for Study 1, I predicted that
reactionism beliefs would follow a similar pattern of effects as policy support and voting
behavior. Specifically, I predicted that reactionism beliefs would be greatest when the past was
framed positively and change as threatening. However, this pattern of effects only partially
emerged. To the contrary, reactionism beliefs where higher when the past was framed negatively

28
(F( 1, 192) = 4.68, p = .03,

= .02, 90% CI = [.00, .08]). But as expected, reactionism beliefs

were higher when a threat was present (F( 1, 192) = 4.53, p = .04,

= .02, 90% CI = [.00, .08]).

Rather than an interactive effect, these effects appear to be additive (see Figure 2). When the past
is framed negatively, people are more likely to report that things used to be better, and all the
more so if the past is framed as threatening! Possible explanations for the finding are discussed
below in the general discussion.
Figure 2
Reactionism: Additive Effects
Negative
Positive

No Threat

Threat

Discussion
In Study 2, I sought to conceptually test two competing hypotheses regarding the
underpinnings of reactionism. There was strong support for the hypotheses that reactionistic
attitudes and behavior is motivated in part by the perception of threat, and not merely by
perceiving the past positively. Specifically, when the past was framed positively (vs. negatively)
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and change was framed as threatening (vs. not threatening) people were more supportive of a
policy from the past, and more likely to vote for the policy. There was also evidence that the
extent to which policy support explains voting behavior as a function of threat depends on how
the past is framed – support for the policy as a function of threat did not explain voting behavior
when the past was framed negatively, perhaps because narrower roads were largely unpopular.
General Discussion
These two studies were guided by two goals. First, I sought to establish the reactionism
beliefs scale as a unique predictor of policy preferences that would resurrect the past, beyond
related constructs like nostalgia and conservatism. I did not find evidence indicating that the
reactionism scale is related to a preference for past policies. The only effect to emerge indicates
that the reactionism scale captures a preference for change, but not necessarily to the past.
Second, I sought to uncover whether reactionism was a purely perceptual or a motivated process.
Evidence from Study 2 strongly suggested that reactionism, operationalized as support for and
voting in favor of a past policy, is motivated by the perception of threat, but only when the past
is framed positively.
The largely null results of Study 1 have two possible explanations. It may be that the
university policies were too mundane to engender any meaningful variability in participants
concern or support. And given that there were six policies that were randomly framed three
different ways, the design of the study created considerable noise in the data. A potential solution
would be to analyze each policy separately. Descriptively, it appears that some policies were
more popular than others (Mpassword = 5.12; Mhandrails = 6.06; Mdesks =6.12; Mcredits = 6.35; Msidewalks
= 7.01; Mexits = 8.00). Breaking down each policy by framing is also revealing (see Figure 3)
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Figure 3
Mean Policy Support as a Function of Framing
Temporal Construal
Policy
M
Past
Sidewalks
7.04
Hand Rails
5.98
Desk Height 5.70
Exits
8.16
Passwords
5.00
Credit
6.54
Status Quo
Sidewalk
7.04
Hand Rails
6.03
Desk Height 6.50
Exits
7.83
Passwords
6.11
Credit
6.37
Future
Sidewalks
6.98
Hand Rails
6.06
Desk Height 6.15
Exits
7.80
Passwords
4.47
Credit
6.13

One-way ANOVA:
Framing Effect on Policy Support
SD
1.35
1.34
1.89
.99
1.71
1.92
1.61
1.39
1.65
1.37
2.05
2.14
1.74
1.46
1.42
1.19
2.26
1.65

F(2,161) = .03, p = .98
F(2,161) = .27, p = .76
F(2,161) = 3.24, p = .04
F(2,161) = 1.08, p = .34
F(2,161) = 9.99, p < .001
F(2,161) = .65, p = .53

Most policies did not differ as a function of framing. Though, desk height was significantly less
supported when framed as a past policy compared to status quo framing (p = .03), and did not
differ from support for future policy framing. Additionally, a status quo bias emerged for support
for password length, such that people were more supportive of the policy when it was framed as
representing the status quo compared to past (p = .07) and future framing (p < .001) . Despite
these two differences, support for policies was relatively consistent regardless of how they were
framed indicating that manipulating the framing was largely ineffective in influencing
participants support.
By splitting the file by framing and conducting partial correlations between the
reactionism and scale and policy support for each policy, controlling for covariates, it’s possible
that the reactionism scale predicted specific policies on the basis of framing. However, only one
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effect emerged; the reactionism scale was negatively correlated to the password (pr = -.29, p =
.04) policy in the status quo condition, but was unrelated in the other framing conditions. The
scale was unrelated to all other policies regardless of their framing. Given the overall lack of
effects is plausible that the policies were simply too mundane and failed to engender engagement
with the materials.
The other possible explanation for Study 1 is that the reactionism scale measures
something other than what it was intended to measure. Perhaps the scale measures the extent to
which people use the past to evaluate the way things are. When a large discrepancy between the
way things were and the way they are is observed, perhaps people are motivated for change. And
maybe any change that appears to be an improvement is acceptable, regardless of whether that
change is reactionary or progressive. However, using data from Study 2, I would argue against
this possibility. Specifically, reactionism beliefs, as operationalized by the reactionism scale,
were significantly higher when a threat was made salient regardless of whether the past was
framed positively or negatively. But when the past was framed negatively and threat was salient,
there was an additive effect – reactionism beliefs were highest.
Framing the past as negative and threatening could have induced participants to generate
their own mental examples of a positive past in order to buffer against the psychological threat
derived from the flyers. This could be viewed as a compensatory response in the face of counterattitudinal information. This explanation is bolstered by the fact that reactionism beliefs were
measured after participants had the opportunity to express support (or lack thereof) for the
policy. For those who hold reactionism beliefs, information to the contrary (a negative and
threatening past) may have been frustrating, and the opportunity to indicate low support for the
(negative and threatening) policy may have augmented that frustration. Thus, when the
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opportunity to express reactionism beliefs became available later in the survey, participants
heightened reactionism beliefs would have been captured by the scale. In contrast, participants in
the positive past condition, for whom the threat of change was made salient, would not have
encountered counter-attitudinal information. Moreover, any need to compensate for the threat (of
change away from a positive past) they were experiencing would have been fulfilled by the
opportunity to express support for and vote in favor of the policy. Thus, later in the survey they
would have been less motivated to express their reactionism beliefs on the scale.
While the possibility that reactionism beliefs are compensatory has yet to be tested,
evidence from Study 2 indicates that reactionistic attitudes and behavior are indeed motivated,
particularly when change is threatening. In study one, no threatening information was provided.
Thus, the extent to which the policies were threatening depended on whether participants
perceived the threat on their own accord. And since reactionism was unrelated to policy support,
given the evidence from Study 2 it’s possible that participants perceived relatively little threat in
the policies due to their mundane nature. The finding that reactionism predicted more support for
policies in the future than policies from past could be a function of regression modeling. After
accounting for the variance explained by several measures of ideology and nostalgia, which are
generally related to perceiving the past positively, the remaining unexplained variance could be
described as a preference for change. The reactionism scale was designed to capture two facets,
perceiving the past more positively than the way things are or will be, and a desire for change
that either literally or symbolically resurrects a positive past. Perhaps participants who showed
more support for future policies did so because they believed things used to be better and could
be that way again. This is empirical question that should be addressed in future studies.
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Implications and Broader Impact
The implications of reactionistic beliefs could be far reaching. Perceiving the past as
better may serve as a motivated cognition with affective consequences that allows for political
goal pursuit. Specifically, theories of threat compensation (see Hart (2014) for a review) predict
that when people perceive a discrepancy between their expected security and actual security –
perhaps due to the perceived inadequacy of policies designed to protect people economically,
socially, or physically (e.g., terrorism threat) – people will experience frustration and anger and
become approach oriented (Carver, 2006). Perceiving the past as ideal and worthy of resurrection
may provide goal content while playing a palliative role in minimizing the immediate threat.
Further, this process may apply to people across the political ideological spectrum since people
of all ideologies are likely to perceive discrepancies between their expectations and actual states.
Though, conservatism may lend itself to reactionistic processes due to conservatisms association
with affinities for the past. For liberals, reactionistic processes may be limited to a more
circumscribed set of phenomena, at least in Western societies where the political trajectory has
bent toward neoliberal progressivism.
Building on the palliative function of reactionism beliefs as a threat compensation
strategy, strategically looking to the past to confirm beliefs about the way society should operate
may lead to worldview defense and therefore political extremism (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).
With the dominance of liberal cultural values juxtaposed with the dominance of conservative
politics (Robin, 2011) there is indication that extremism and rigidity is no longer relegated to the
political right (cf. Jost et al., 2003, 2007). As people’s political, economic, and social goals
become perceivably more threatened, perceiving the past as better and worth resurrecting may
become increasingly common as people search for a way forward. And the affective
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consequences (e.g., frustration and anger) associated with perceiving barriers to these past ideals
may facilitate extreme behaviors. Anecdotally, the violence between Trump supporters and
dissenters at political rallies could be interpreted as reflecting these extreme behavioral
outcomes.
Believing that the past is better and worth resurrecting could be motivated by several
psychological variables that facilitate the pursuit political goals. For example, conservatives may
believe that traditions and authority are no longer respected (Altmeyer, 1988), or that social and
economic hierarchies are being subverted (Pratto et al., 1994), so they may be motivated to
perceive the past as ideal and worthy of resurrection. Indeed, reactionism may play an important
role in the perpetuation of multiple forms of prejudice. Conversely, liberals may believe that
progress towards economic and social equality (Haidt & Graham, 2007) is being subverted and
may be motivated to perceive the past as better. Thus, while conservatives may be more prone to
reactionistic thinking due to a greater focus on conserving a status quo that often maintains long
standing ideals, liberals may be equally susceptible to strategically perceiving the past as better
when it facilitates their political goals.
Indeed, should reactionism be an important antecedent to pursing goals that serve to
resurrect the past, reactionistic thinking may have utility across many life experiences. Dieters
may strive to recreate a body image of the past. Sports teams may seek to recreate past glories.
Luddites, agrarians, and utopian idealist may seek to go back to simpler times. Perhaps
reactionism can lead to objectively positive outcomes as dieters, substance abusers, and patients
recovering from intensive therapies (e.g., radiation) seek to overcome the threat of change and
reestablish lost health.
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Limitations and Future Directions
There were several notable limitations across the studies, some of which have been
discussed and solutions proposed (e.g., counterbalancing noise in Study 1). A notable limitation
is the measurement of reactionism. A persistent concern is whether it is measuring what I think
it’s measuring. To try and understand more about what reactionism is measuring I split the file in
the Study 2 by valence, threat, and counterbalance. Then I conducted partial correlations between
the reactionism scale, policy support, and voting behavior, controlling for regulatory attitudes,
ideology, and nostalgia. The results were illuminating. Despite the fact that I have
conceptualized reactionism as being motivated by perceived decline relative to the past, an
assumption supported by Study 2, the scale itself only predicted policy support and voting
behavior when the past was framed positively, no threat was presented, and the road width to be
resurrected were wider roads. I refer to this as the “rose colored glasses” condition, a seemingly
best case scenario. Stated plainly, higher scores on the reactionism scale predicted greater
reactionary attitudes (pr = .65, p = .001) and behavior (pr = .49, p = .02) when it was a
romanticized version of the past that is to be resurrected. The scale marginally predicted more
voting (pr = .41, p = .09) for a negative past policy that was framed as threatening, but only
when that past policy would bring back wider roads. In the case the scale seems to predict a
rejection of the how the past was construed. Finally, the scale marginally predicted less voting
(pr = -.56, p = .06) for the policy when the past was framed negatively and as threatening, and
when the policy would bring back narrower roads.
Taken together, the scale seems to predict a desire to resurrect popular policies from the
past, even when framed negatively and as threatening, and a desire to avoid unpopular policies
from the past. Interestingly, and contrary to my conceptualization, when the past is framed
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positively, and change away from the past is perceived as threatening, reactionism is unrelated to
reactionary attitudes and behavior, even when the policy is popular (i.e., wider roads). This is
despite the fact that reactionary attitudes and behavior were most prevalent under these
circumstances. It seems clear that the scale, as a proxy for reactionism beliefs, is missing an
important facet – the perception that alternatives to a perceivable better past are threatening.
Future efforts at constructing a scale to operationalize reactionism will take heed of this
evidence.
The design and materials of Study 2 also posed some limitations. For instance, the threat
was varied as a function of counterbalancing. 33% more fatalities may be inherently more
threatening to people than 50% more accidents since the former explicitly mentions mortality,
but the opposite could have true since the absolute value of accidents was higher in the latter.
However, even when wider roads were framed as threatening (33% more fatalities) people still
showed more support for widening the roads than for making them narrower. Thus, while
counterbalancing effects persisted, they are not uninformative since the variable appears to map
onto policy popularity. And while overall support for an unpopular policy was lower, when it
was framed as part of a positive past, and change away from that past was threatening, people
supported the unpopular policy more, and were more likely to vote for it. Future research should
employ pilot testing to evaluate the popularity of policies in an effort to find policies that could
be characterized as neutral in order to eliminate the effect of popularity on attitudes and
behavior.
More conceptually, there is the possibility that in Study 2, by framing the past as both
negatively and threatening people were prevention motivated, and by framing the past as positive
and the alternative as threatening, people were promotion motivated. Voting for policies that are
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framed as good and help avoid negative outcomes could be explained by rational decision
making or simple hedonism. However, when threatening information was not provided, voting
behavior and policy support was unaffected by the valence of the past (p > .2 and p > .8,
respectively). So being told the past was good or bad did not influence people the way it should
if they were behaving rationally. Though, it’s also rationale to avoid threats. However, even
when an unpopular policy from the past was framed negatively and as threatening (i.e., Let a
Bygone Era [narrower roads] Be Gone! 50% more accidents on narrower roads) there were still
people who voted, seemingly against their self-interest, to resurrect the policy (11%). So while
regulatory focus and rational self-interest might play a role in some individual’s decision
making, this was not the case for everyone.
A final notable limitation of these studies is the narrow context within which reactionism
is being studied. As mentioned previously, reactionistic beliefs may apply to a variety of
situations beyond those involving politics. In the proposed studies I am treating reactionism as a
strictly political phenomenon. But in an effort to more accurately define reactionism (as strictly
political or not) the phenomenon should be studied across a variety of contexts where people
may be motivated to perceive the past as better and worth resurrecting.
Conclusion
In this proposal I have argued that reactionism is an overlooked and important set of
beliefs that may play a critical role in political dynamics and beyond. I have proposed two initial
studies to test the underlying assumptions of reactionism – that perceiving the past as good, and
change as threatening, is necessary for reactionistic attitudes and behavior. Validating these
assumptions serves as the first step towards a long term program of research that will serve to
elucidate the role of a strategic belief about the past that may motivate political behavior.
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Appendix A (Nostalgia Inventory items)
Family
Things you did
Holidays
Heroes and heroines
Toys
The way society was
Not having to worry
The way people were
Pet or pets
Places
Feelings you had
Not knowing sad or evil things
Music
TV shows, movies
Church or Temple, etc.
Someone you loved
School
Your house
Friends
Having someone to depend on
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Appendix B (Historic Nostalgia Scale items)
1. They don't make ‘em like they used to
2. Things used to be better in the good old days
3. Products are getting shoddier and shoddier
4. Technological change will ensure a brighter future (reverse coded)
5. History involves a steady improvement in human welfare (reverse coded)
6. We are experiencing a decline in the quality of life
7. Steady growth in GNP has brought increased human happiness (reverse coded)
8. Modern business constantly builds a better tomorrow (reverse coded)
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Appendix C (Study 2 materials: flyers)
Positive past with threat (wider roads)

Positive past with no threat (wider roads)
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Negative Past with threat (narrow roads)

Negative Past with no threat (narrow roads)
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